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‘A devil, a born devil, on whose nature Nurture can never stick; 
on whom my pains Humanely taken, all, all lost, quite lost.’
The Tempest, IV,i.
‘And thus I clothe my naked villainy …
And seem a saint when most I play the devil.’
Richard III, I,ii.
This paper, which is divided into five parts, has been prompted by the continuing interest in the
complex and emotive topic of psychopathic disorder1 and the possibility of a government Bill
aimed at revising the current mental health legislation being introduced in 2003. The unclear nature
of the condition and the controversies surrounding it are well encapsulated in the two quotations
that head this paper. One or two other literary allusions will also be called in aid later.
Background
Some twenty-five years ago I made the following observations in a paper that appeared in the Prison
Service Journal.2
Imagine if you can, a top-level conference has been called to discuss the meaning of that much used
and abused word psychopathy. You are privileged to be an observer at these discussions at which are
present psychiatrists, psychologists, sociologists, lawyers, sentencers, theologians, philosophers,
staff of penal establishments and special hospitals and social workers. You have high expectations
that some total wisdom will come from this well-informed and experienced group of people and
that a definition will emerge that will pass the closest scrutiny of all concerned. After all, this is a
* The sub-title is taken from Chapter 5 of the first edition
of my book Offenders, Deviants or Patients? – An
Introduction to the Study of Socio-Forensic Problems,
(1980, Tavistock), its purpose being to leave readers to
judge the extent to which we have moved in our
understanding in something over twenty years.
** M. Phil, Hon. LL.D., Professor, Midlands Centre for
Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of
Loughborough. (Correspondence to: 1, Home Close
Road, Houghton-on-the-Hill, Leicester, LE7 9GT, UK).
1 For purposes of brevity and convenience the term
‘psychopathic disorder’ is used here to encompass severe
anti-social personality disorder, dissocial personality
disorder and, perhaps more controversially, dangerous
severe personality disorder (DSPD).
2 Prins, H. (1977) ‘I think they call them Psychopaths’,
Prison Service Journal, 28: 8–9.
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gathering of experts. Alas, your expectations would have a quality of fantasy about them, for in
reality you would find as many definitions as experts present. Let me just present one or two
examples of this statement. There would be little agreement amongst psychiatrists; for some
continental psychiatrists, the term would be used to cover a very wide range of mental disorders,
including those we might describe as neuroses in this country; for some psychiatrists (for example,
from the United States) the term might include minor disorders of personality and for others, the
term might be synonymous with what we would describe as recidivism. The lawyers in the group
would disagree also. Some might well accept the definition in the Mental Health Act, 1959 … [as it
then was] … which describes psychopathy as a ‘persistent disorder or disability of mind (whether
or not including subnormality of intelligence) which results in abnormally aggressive behaviour or
seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the patient and requires or is susceptible to medical
treatment …’ However, they would immediately begin to ask questions about the legal implications
of the words ‘disability of mind’ and ‘irresponsible conduct’. At this stage, the philosophers would
no doubt chip in and also ask searching questions about the same terms. Later on in the discussion,
a theologian might start asking awkward questions about the differences between ‘sickness’ and ‘sin’
and ‘good’ and ‘evil’.3 The representative from the field of sociology in the group might usefully
remind us that psychopaths lack what they describe as a capacity for role-taking, i.e. seeing yourself
in an appropriate role in relation to others in their roles in [their] environment. And so the
discussion would go on and on. Don’t assume that it has ever been different. For one hundred and
fifty years the arguments have raged over definition, classification and management. (pp. 8–9).
Readers of this Journal might well ask ‘Have things changed much since you wrote that?’ To which
I would be forced to answer, ‘not that much’. Today, such a group might well be somewhat more
representative. We could usefully find space for a geneticist, a developmental paediatrician,
representatives from the Home Office and Department of Health, from the voluntary sector (who
do so much to cope with these ‘hard to like’ individuals) and who knows, in this more progressive
day and age – a consumer of the service and a victim? A more recent and near parallel to such an
hypothetical group can perhaps be seen in the large conference called by the Secretaries of State
for Social Services and the Home Department in July 1999, to receive and comment upon their
joint proposals for dealing with the management of those persons exhibiting dangerous severe
personality disorder (DSPD). As one who was asked to comment upon the proposals at this
conference, I was painfully aware of the continuing complexities surrounding the phenomenon we
label psychopathic disorder.4 It is of particular interest to note that the government (perhaps very
wisely) only provided a loose definition of what they understood dangerous severe personality
disorder to be and expressed the firm intention to fund major research into the problem – an
intention currently being put into practice.5 Recent concerns about those individuals posing a
3 For an up-dated discussion of this aspect see Prins, H.
(1994) ‘Psychiatry and the Concept of Evil: Sick in
Heart or Sick in Mind.’ British Journal of Psychiatry,
165: 297–302.
4 See Home Office and Department of Health (1999)
Managing Dangerous People With Severe Personality
Disorder: Proposals For Policy Development. July 1999.
A shortened version of my address may be found in
Prins, H. (1999) ‘Dangerous Severe Personality
Disorder: An Independent View’. Prison Service
Journal, 126 8–10.
5 Personality disorder is referred to in the document as ‘an
inclusive term referring to a disorder of the development
of personality’ … ‘and is not a category of mental
illness’ (p.5 footnote 1). At page 9, the document states
that the phrase ‘dangerous severely personality
disordered ((DSPD) is used in this paper to describe
people who have an identifiable personality disorder to a
severe degree, who pose a high risk to other people
because of serious anti-social behaviour resulting from
their disorder’. These definitions can reasonably be
regarded as ‘loose’.
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serious threat to others and the manner in which successive governments have sought to deal with
them have already been addressed by me in this Journal. I shall therefore not repeat them here, but
proceed directly to some observations on the development of the concept of psychopathic
disorder.6
Development of the concept
There are numerous accounts of the development of the concept of psychopathic disorder and, at
the risk of being accused of a degree of invidious selection, I shall only refer to one or two
specifically. For those wishing to pursue this aspect in more depth the references quoted in
footnote7 may be of assistance. Although the French psychiatrist Pinel is usually credited with the
first description of clinical cases of psychopathic disorder in 1806, there must have been persons
exhibiting those characteristics we would regard as psychopathic long before Pinel’s time. From an
historical perspective one could cite such characters as Gilles de Rais – the sexual sadistic murderer
of children, Vlad the Impaler and numerous others. An example from Biblical times is said to be
that of Samson, described (no doubt somewhat with tongue in cheek) by Dr. Eric Altschuler of the
University of California. According to him, Samson had a number of adult psychopathic
characteristics; moreover, as a child Samson showed severe personality disorder, ‘setting things on
fire, torturing animals and bullying other children’. Doctor Altschuler also cites Samson’s mother
as a possible pathogenic element in his development. Apparently, in the account in the Book of
Judges, ‘she is warned not to drink while she is pregnant’. Dr. Altschuler concludes that
‘Recklessness and a disregard for others may have run in the family.’8 To return to Pinel. It is likely
that he included a number of cases in his examples that we should not consider today as falling
within current classifications. It was in the 1830’s that the English alienist (psychiatrist) and
anthropologist Prichard formulated his well known concept of ‘moral insanity’. He described it
thus:–
a madness, consisting of a morbid perversion of the natural feelings, affections, inclinations,
temper, habits, moral dispositions and natural impulses, without any remarkable disorder or
defect of the intellect or knowing or reasoning faculties, and particularly without any insane
illusion or hallucination. (Emphases added). (p.135).9
In the context of this quotation we should note that ‘moral’ meant emotional and psychological
and was not intended to denote the opposite of ‘immoral’ as used in modern parlance. This view
of ‘moral insanity’ rested on the then, fairly widely held, controversial belief that there could be a
separate moral sense that could, as it were, be diseased. This early notion finds resonance in
6 See Prins, H. (2002) ‘Incapacitating the Dangerous in
England and Wales – High Expectations – Harsh
Reality.’ Journal of Mental Health Law, (February:
5–20. (Notably at pp 5–8). For useful commentary on
current concerns see also Laing (1999), in this Journal,
‘An End to the Lottery? – The Fallon Report on
Personality Disordered Offenders’. October, 87–104.
7 A summary of some of the earlier writings on the topic
may be found in H. Prins (1980) Offenders, Deviants or
Patients? Chapter 5 at pp 139–141. Some writers are, of
course, seminal; for example, H. Cleckley, in his Mask
of Sanity. (Fifth Ed), (1975, C.V. Mosby Co.).
McCord, W. and McCord, J. Psychopathy and
Delinquency. (1956, Grune and Stratton). Lewis, A.
(1974) ‘Psychopathic Personality: A Most Elusive
Category.’ Psychological Medicine, 4: 133–40. In more
recent times the work of Professor Robert Hare has had
an important influence in the areas of diagnosis. For a
summary see for example, Hare, R. Without Conscience:
The Disturbing World of the Psychopaths Amongst Us.
(1993, Pocket Books).
8 As reported in The Independent of February 15th,
2002, citing a paper in The New Scientist.
9 Prichard, J.C. Treatise on Insanity. (1835, Gilbert and
Piper).
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Cleckley’s later postulation that psychopathy was a particular form of ‘illness’. Prichard’s views
need to be seen against the background of the very rudimentary state of psychiatric and
psychological knowledge during his lifetime. In the 1880’s, Koch formulated the concept of
constitutional psychopathy, implying that there was a considerable innate predisposition; a line of
thinking much in keeping with the then contemporary interest in hereditary factors in the
causation of delinquency. It is interesting to note a comparable re-awakening in more recent times
in the study of neuro-physio-psychological processes in the causation of persistent deviancy.10
In 1910, Mercier laid claim to have been the originator of the terms ‘moral defective’ and ‘moral
imbecile’ – these eventually finding their way into the Mental Deficiency Act of 1913 (and
subsequently changed to somewhat less pejorative descriptions in an amending Act of 1927).
Certain trends in the 1930’s were of importance. Findings from the disciplines of neurology and
physiology were being applied to behaviour disorders – prompted no doubt by the sequelae of the
widespread epidemics of disorders such as epidemic encephalitis. Freudian perspectives were also
being applied increasingly to deviant behaviour in the work of psycho-analytically orientated
medical and non-medical professionals such as Melitta Schmideberg, Kate Friedlander, Anna Freud
and August Aichorn; they were all interested in the possible childhood roots of serious anti-social
behaviour.11 In 1939, Henderson – a distinguished British psychiatrist – published his famous work
Psychopathic States. He considered that the psychopath’s ‘failure to adjust to ordinary social life is
not a mere wilfulness or badness which can be threatened or thrashed out … but constitutes a true
illness’.12 Since the nineteen-sixties attention has been focused on the management of adult
psychopathically disordered individuals within institutional settings, notably those adopting a
therapeutic community or ‘social milieu’ approach. Figures eminent in this field include
psychiatrists such as Jones and Whiteley.13
Summarising the foregoing, it is possible to trace three important themes in the development of
the concept. The first, as Coid14 has suggested, was the concept of abnormal personality as defined
by social maladjustment – developed in France and later in the UK – leading to the current legal
definition of psychopathic disorder (of which more later). The second was the concept of mental
degeneracy, also originating in France. The third was the German notion of defining abnormal
psychopathic personality types, as illustrated in the work of Kurt Schneider.15 In addition, the
concept has not been without attention from central government over the years. It was considered
by the Butler Committee as long ago as the early nineteen-seventies, subsequently in a joint DHSS
and Home Office Consultation Document on the topic in 1986, by the Reed Committee in 1994,
10 See, for example, Blair, J., and Frith, U. (2000)
‘Neurocognitive Explanations of the Anti-social
Personality Disorders.’ Criminal Behaviour and Mental
Health, 10: S66–S81. (Special Supplement).
11 For an interesting compilation of thirties and forties
accounts of work in this field see Eisseler, K.R. (ed)
Searchlights on Delinquency: New Psychoanalytic
Studies. (Imago Publishing, 1949). The later work of
Lee Robins is also seminal in this area; see, for example,
Robins, L.N. Deviant Children Grown Up. 
A Sociological and Psychiatric Study of Sociopathic
Personality. (1966, Williams and Wilkins). The work of
Bowlby on attachment theory has been of profound
importance; see, for example, Bowlby, J. The Making
and Breaking of Affectional Bonds. (1979, Tavistock).
The work of Sir Michael Rutter has also been of great
significance; see Rutter M.L. (1999) ‘Psychosocial
Adversity and Child Psychopathology.’ British Journal
of Psychiatry, 174: 480–493.
12 Henderson, D. Psychopathic States. (1939, Norton). p. 13.
13 See, for example, Jones, M. (1963) ‘The Treatment of
Character Disorders.’ British Journal of Criminology, 3:
276–282. And, Whiteley, J.S. (1994), ‘In Pursuit of the
Elusive Category.’ British Journal of Psychiatry Review
of Books, 7: 14–17.
14 Coid, J. ‘Current Concepts and Classifications in
Psychopathic Disorder.’ In P. Tyrer and G. Stein (eds)
Personality Disorder Reviewed. (Gaskell, 1993).
15 Schneider, K. Psychopathic Personalities. (1958 Cassell).
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and most recently in the joint Home Office and Department of Health policy development
document to which I have already referred.16 I have provided representation of the stages through
which the concept has passed in Figure I.
Figure I From Pinel (1806) to Home Office and Department of Health 1999
Causes and characteristics
There is vast literature concerning the postulated origins of psychopathic disorder and an equally
vast literature on its characteristic features. No attempt is made here to review this literature at great
length, merely to address certain aspects of it as a prelude to some discussion of problems of
management.17 Postulated origins have included genetic and hereditary factors, cortical immaturity
showing brain-waves more commonly found in children and close familial and environmental
influences. Professor Coid, a respected authority in the field, advocates caution in espousing the
notion of psychopathic disorder as a single entity. He suggests that
The sheer complexity and range of psychopathology in psychopathic disorder has previously
led to the suggestion that these individuals could be considered to suffer from a series of
conditions that would best be subsumed under a broad generic term ‘psychopathic disorders’
rather than a single entity.18
16 See Home Office and Department of Health and Social
Security, Report of the Committee on Mentally
Abnormal Offenders. (Chairman, Lord Butler of
Saffron Walden). Cmnd. 6244. (HMSO, 1975).
Department of Health and Social Security and Home
Office, Consultation Document: Offenders Suffering
From Psychopathic Disorder. (1986, HMSO).
Department of Health and Home Office, Report of the
Department of Health and Home Office Working
Group on Psychopathic Disorder. (Chairman, Doctor
John Reed, CB. (1994, HMSO). The whole topic was
also considered in considerable depth by the Fallon
Committee in its inquiry into the Personality Disorder
Unit at Ashworth Hospital. See Volume II of the
Report, which contains very extensive expert evidence on
the nature of personality disorder. Report of the
Committee of Inquiry into the Personality Disorder
Unit, Ashworth Special Hospital. Chairman His
Honour Judge Fallon, Cm 4195. (1999, TSO).
17 A useful review of all these aspects may be found in
Livesley, W.J., (ed), Handbook of Personality Disorders:
Theory, Research and Treatment . (2001, Guilford
Press). For a predominantly UK perspective, see Tyrer, P.
and Stein, G. (eds), Personality Disorder Reviewed.
(1993, Gaskell).
18 Coid, J.W. (1989) ‘Psychopathic Disorders.’ Current
opinion in Psychiatry, 2: 750–756.
Manie sans délire (madness without delirium or delusion) 
moral insanity 
moral imbecility (defectiveness) (Mental Deficiency Act 1913) 




antisocial personality disorder (DSMIV) 
dissocial personality disorder (ICD10) 
dangerous severe personality disorder.
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In recent times, interest has been revived concerning possible ‘organic’ causes, including both
major and minor cerebral ‘insults’ in infancy and in the consequences of obstetric complications.
If such developments subsequently prove to have unequivocally firm foundations, one could
envisage a situation where issues of responsibility (and notably diminished responsibility) may well
have to be addressed. This is an arena already fraught with problems concerning the relationship
between medicine (notably neurology and psychiatry) and the law. The environment has also been
held to play a powerful part in the aetiology of the disorder. It may well be, that as with similar
mental disorders, such as the schizophrenias, it is the interplay of social forces and pressures acting
upon an already vulnerable personality (for whatever reason) that may tend to produce the
condition. Some of the highly complicated and sophisticated neuro-physio-chemical research
undertaken in recent years fosters speculation that some of the answers to the problem of aetiology
may eventually be found in the area of brain biochemistry. Other possibilities are of equal interest.
For example, one cannot ignore the evidence, admittedly laboratory-based, of such factors as low
anxiety thresholds, cortical immaturity, frontal lobe damage and, perhaps most relevant of all, the
true (as distinct from the wrongly labelled) psychopath’s need for excitement – the achievement of
a ‘high’. Such a need is described very graphically in Wambaugh’s account of the case of Colin
Pitchfork. Pitchfork was convicted of the rape and murder of two teenage girls in Leicestershire
during the period 1983–1986. In interviews with the police, it is alleged he stated that he obtained
a ‘high’ when he exposed himself to women (he had previous convictions for indecent exposure
prior to his two major offences); he also obtained a ‘high’ from the knowledge that his victims or
likely victims were virgo intacta. He is said to have also described an additional aspect of his
excitement, namely obtaining sex outside marriage. As with others assessed as psychopathic, he
also demonstrated a great degree of charm; for example, he was able to get his wife to forgive him
for a number of instances of admitted unfaithfulness. (Pitchfork’s case is also of interest in that it
involved the earliest attempt to use DNA profiling – a practice that now seems fairly routine).19
Some Key Characteristics
Some of these have already been alluded to above. Sir Martin Roth, a doyen of British psychiatry,
has suggested (in summary form) that the key features are egotism, immaturity in various
manifestations, aggressiveness, low frustration tolerance and the inability to learn from experience
so that social demands and expectations are never met.20 Roth’s brief listing encapsulates many of
the more detailed characteristics suggested by Cleckley in the various editions of his seminal work
The Mask of Sanity.21 To these items I would add the following three elements. First, the curious
super-ego lacunae, rather than the total lack of conscience suggested by some authorities. Second, the
greater than usual need for excitement and arousal to which I have already referred. Third, a
capacity to create chaos among family, friends, and those involved in trying to manage or contain
them. I would suggest that this last characteristic is one of the most accurate indicators of the true,
as distinct from the pejoratively labelled, psychopath and is one often attested to by those who
have had extensive clinical experience of dealing with the psychopathic. The lack of true feeling
content (empathy) exhibited by the psychopath was stated graphically some forty years ago by
19 Wambaugh, J. The Blooding. (1989, Bantam Books).
20 Roth, Sir Martin, ‘Psychopathic (Sociopathic)
Personality.’ In R. Bluglass and P. Bowden (eds),
Principles and Practice of Forensic Psychiatry. (1990,
Churchill Livingstone).
21 See footnote 7 supra.
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Johns and Quay in their comment that psychopaths ‘know the words but not the music’.22 Rieber
and Green add four salient characteristics in support of the foregoing. These are thrill-seeking,
pathological glibness, anti-social pursuit of power and absence of guilt. They also give great
prominence to the element of thrill-seeking. They describe the psychopath as ‘performing a
Mephisto Waltz on the tightrope of danger’.23 It is as though this phenomenon of ‘thrill-seeking’
is necessary to fill the emotional void so often encountered in the psychopathically disordered.
This internal ‘emptiness’ has also been stressed by Whiteley. He quotes a former patient writing to
him from prison:
I thought everything I said, did and thought was not real, that I was not real, almost as though
I did not exist, so I could never affect anyone because I was not real, no-one could possibly take
me seriously because I was not real. (p.16).24
If we see psychopathic disorder as a developmental process then we need not rely exclusively upon
clinical depictions. Its nature, early onset and manifestations are depicted clearly in the aged
Duchess of York’s reviling of her son Richard III in Act IV Sc. iv of Shakespeare’s play.
… Thou cam’st on earth to make the earth my hell.
A grievous burden was thy birth to me;
Tetchy and wayward was thy infancy;
Thy school-days frightful, desp’rate, wild and furious.
Thy prime of manhood daring, bold and venturous;
Thy age confirm’d, proud, subtle, sly and bloody,
More mild, but yet more harmful kind in hatred.
What comfortable hour can’st thou name
That ever grac’d me with thy company?
Here, we have the aged Duchess describing graphically some of the characteristics we regard as
important in terms of both aetiology and presentation. For example, an apparently difficult birth,
long-standing anti-sociality (a requirement of the DSM-IV(R), the ICD 10 and current mental
health legislation in England and Wales), becoming more marked in adulthood; all this
accompanied by a veneer of charm and sophistication which only serves to act as a mask for the
underlying themes of chaos and potential for destructiveness.25
Describing and trying to delineate a disorder has the advantage of hopefully setting some
boundaries to it and creating typologies that may assist in management, even if the latter is highly
22 Johns, J.H. and Quay, H.C. (1962) ‘The Effects of
Social Reward on Verbal Conditioning in Psychopathic
and neurotic Military Offenders.’ Journal of
Consulting Psychology, 26: 217–220.
23 Rieber, R.W. and Green, M.R. (1988), The Psychopathy
of Everyday Life. Unpublished Manuscript. Quoted in
Egger, S.Q., Serial Murder: An Elusive Phenomenon.
(1990, Praeger). (p.82).
24 Whiteley, J.S. (1994) ‘In Pursuit of the Elusive
Category.’ British Journal of Psychiatry Review of
Books, 7: 14–17.
25 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. IV(R). (1994,
Washington DC). World Health Organisation. The
ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural
Disorders: Clinical Descriptions and Diagnostic
Guidelines. (1992, Geneva). It should be noted that
neither the DSM nor the ICD 10 refer to psychopathic
disorder; the former refers to anti-social personality
disorder and the latter to dissocial personality disorder.
Neither descriptions equate exactly with the current
legal description – psychopathic disorder – a word that
numerous committees have suggested abandoning,
preferring personality disorder – which would not be
defined further. (See also footnote 17 supra). However,
we should perhaps be mindful of the reference to
‘naming’ in Romeo and Juliet: ‘What’s in a name? That
which we call a rose by any other name would smell as
sweet.’ (Act II, Sc ii). Changing the name will not
necessarily do away with our dislike for such
patients/clients/offenders.
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problematic (as we shall see shortly). We should also note that a number of authorities feel that
the current espousal of the term ‘psychopathic’ is unhelpful, see for example, Blackburn,
Cavadino, Lewis and Appleby.26
Some problems of management
This section of the paper is divided into two parts. Part One deals predominantly with legal aspects
and Part Two with clinical matters. To a great extent the two elements should be seen as a whole,
but in an attempt to achieve clarity, I have chosen to split them. Readers should note that this a
largely artificial (and somewhat pedantic) distinction.
Part One – Legal Aspects
The nature of psychopathic disorder and the problems it has presented to courts and counsel, are
likely to bring to the fore powerful views as to the nature of the attitudes towards the disorder.
This state of affairs is exemplified usefully in two brief quotations. Mr. Bumble, the Beadle in
Oliver Twist, says ‘The Law is a ass, a idiot’, and the redoubtable jurist Lord Coke stated that ‘The
Law is the perfection of reason.’ In England and Wales, a legal definition of psychopathic disorder
was first introduced in the Mental Health Act, 1959. (In Scotland and Northern Ireland the term
is not used directly). In the 1959 Act, treatability was linked to the definition of the disorder …
‘and requires, or is susceptible to treatment’. Section 1(4). The definition of the disorder was left
substantially unchanged in the 1983 Act, with the important exception of the removal of the
sentence relating to treatability; the latter finds expression in Sections 3,37 and 45A of the Act,
where it must be demonstrated that … ‘such treatment is likely to alleviate or prevent a deterioration
of his condition’. (Emphasis added). Section 45A of the 1983 Act (inserted by Section 46 of the
Crime (Sentences) Act, 1997) makes provision for the so-called ‘Hybrid Order’. This enables a
Crown Court to impose a sentence of imprisonment upon an offender (but only in cases where the
sentence is not fixed by law, e.g. in convictions for murder). The patient must be diagnosed as
suffering from psychopathic disorder and the court may direct that such an individual shall be
admitted to a specified hospital. The provision is known as a ‘Hospital and Limitation Direction’.
Should the offender/patient no longer need, or be responsive to, treatment before his or her release
date, the Responsible Medical Officer may seek the offender/patient’s transfer to prison. The
‘limitation’ element has the effect of a Restriction Order under Section 41 of the 1983 Act. As far
as can be ascertained, at the time of writing, it appears that courts have been slow to utilise this
new provision. The change occurred due to a growing and understandable reluctance on the part
of psychiatrists to manage such people. In the late nineteen-fifties there was a degree of optimism
that psychiatry and psychiatrists had the answers not only to treatable mental illness (such as the
major psychoses, e.g. the schizophrenias and affective psychoses) but that this optimism (which was
not wholly justified or eventually sustainable even for the psychoses) could be extended to forms
26 Blackburn, R. (1988) ‘On Moral Judgements and
Personality Disorders: The Myth of Psychopathic
Personality Revisited.’ British Journal of Psychiatry,
153: 505–512. Cavadino, M. (1998) ‘Death to the
Psychopath.’ Journal of Forensic Psychiatry, 9: 5–8.
Lewis, G. and Appleby, L. (1988) ‘Personality
Disorder: The Patients Psychiatrists Dislike.’ British
Journal of Psychiatry, 153: 44–49.
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of mental disorder such as psychopathy.27 Professor John Gunn has suggested an additional reason
for the change of emphasis regarding treatability. This lies in the parlous state of general psychiatric
provision, more particularly in large conurbations such as London.28 The legal connotations of
treatment have resulted in a number of court rulings, both in England and Wales and in Scotland.
In the case of R. v. Canons Park Mental Health Review Tribunal (ex parte A. 1995. QB 60), the Court
of Appeal held that a mere refusal of a patient to participate in group psychotherapy did not, of
itself, indicate untreatability. A case in Scotland Reid v. Secretary of State for Scotland (1999)
re-opened the whole issue.29 In brief, this case concerned an offender-patient detained without limit
of time under the provisions of the Scottish Mental Health Act, 1984. In a ruling, the Law Lords
held that under Section 145(1) of that Act, medical treatment was to be given a broad meaning and
that supervised care which endeavoured to prevent deterioration of the symptoms, but not the
disorder itself, might in a particular case justify liability to continued detention. (Emphases added).
In hearing this case the Law Lords decided inter alia that the Canons Park case had been wrongly
decided. Eldergill summarises the degree of latitude which appears to be allowed currently:
It can be seen that the treatability condition is satisfied if medical treatment in its broadest
statutory sense – which includes nursing care – is eventually likely to bring some symptomatic relief
to prevent the patient’s mental health from deteriorating. There are few (if any) conditions which are
not treatable in this sense. (p.225).30
However, the saga does not end with the decision in that case. There have been continuing concerns
about possible loopholes in the law that would allow dangerous psychopaths to obtain their
freedom. Again, in Scotland, the case of Ruddle31 led the Scottish Parliament to pass, as a matter
of urgency, the Mental Health (Public Safety and Appeals) (Scotland) Act, 1999, which has added
public safety to the grounds for not discharging patients under Scottish mental health legislation.
The main effect of this legislation was to change the definition of mental disorder ‘to mental illness
(including personality disorder) or mental handicap however caused or manifested’ and to require
continued detention of a restricted patient ‘if the patient is suffering from a mental disorder the
effect of which is such that it is necessary in order to protect the public from serious harm, that
the patient continues to be detained in a hospital whether for medical treatment or not’.32 ‘One of
the “incidental” effects of this enactment has been to clarify the fact that personality disorder [had]
always been included (but by implication only) within the meaning of mental disorder in Scottish
mental health legislation.’ (op.cit.). Crichton et al. suggest that the Act of 1999 merely plugged ‘a
27 As to whether personality disorder (psychopathy) is an
illness or a disorder see Kendall. Kendall suggests that
‘The historical reasons for regarding personality
disorders as fundamentally different from mental
illnesses are being undermined by both clinical and
genetic evidence. Effective treatments for personality
disorders would probably have a decisive influence on
psychiatrists’ attitudes.’ Kendall, R.E. (1999) ‘the
Distinction Between Personality Disorder and Mental
Illness.’ British Journal of Psychiatry, 180: 110–115.
28 Gunn, J. (1999) ‘The Ashenputtel Principle.’ Criminal
Behaviour and Mental Health, 9: 205–206. 
29 1999 2 WLR 28.
30 Eldergill, A., Mental Health Review Tribunals : Law
and Practice. (1997, Sweet and Maxwell).
31 Ruddle v. Secretary of State for Scotland 1999 GWD
29 1395.
32 Crichton, H.M., Darjee, R., McCall Smith, A. and
Chiswick, D. (2001) ‘Mental Health (Public Safety and
Appeals) (Scotland) Act, 1999: Detention of
Untreatable Patients With Psychopathic Disorder.’ The
Journal of Forensic Psychiatry, 12: 647–661.
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loophole’ and that further developments should wait upon any action that may be taken as a result
of the two major reviews of Scottish mental health legislation and practice by the Millan and
Maclean Committees.33
Part Two – Clinical Matters
From all that I have written so far, it should be obvious that those labelled as psychopathic present
enormous psycho-socio-legal problems and that their day-to-day management causes the
professionals involved both ‘headache’ and ‘heart-ache’. Indeed, the heading of this sub-section of
the paper might well have been called ‘encounters of an uncomfortable kind’. Some aspects of
mental health and criminal justice professionals’ engagement in these ‘encounters’ have already
been touched upon and the intention in this section is merely to highlight some of them further.
My late friend and colleague – Doctor Peter Scott – addressed some of these issues over twenty-
five years ago in a very thought-provoking paper entitled Has Psychiatry Failed in the Treatment of
Offenders?34 Scott suggested that we most frequently fail those who need us most. These individuals
frequently fall into two (perhaps overlapping) categories, the ‘dangerous offender’ and the
‘unrewarding’, ‘degenerate’ and ‘not nice’ offender. Of the ‘embarrassing’ patient Scott maintained
that he/she is the patient who is ‘essentially the one who does not pay for treatment, the coin in
which patients pay is ‘(i) dependence – i.e. being manifestly unable to care for themselves, and thus
appealing to the maternal part of our nature; (ii) getting better (responding to our “life-giving”
measures); (iii) in either of these processes, showing gratitude, if possible cheerfully’. (p.8) In other
words, those patients/clients/offenders that Scott had in mind are just the ones who reject our ‘best
efforts’, are manipulative and delight in giving us a pretext for rejecting them, so that they can
continue on their ‘unloved’ and ‘unloving’ way. In Scott’s terms, ‘the “not nice” patients are the
ones who habitually ‘appear to be well able to look after themselves but don’t and, as stated above,
reject attempts to help them, break the institutional rules, get drunk, upset other patients, or even
quietly go to the devil in their own way quite heedless of nurse and doctor’. Scott went on to
suggest other factors which are highly relevant to any consideration of the management of so-called
psychopaths.35 (Emphasis added). He stated that:
There is a natural philanthropic tendency to extend help to the defenceless – probably an
extension of parental caring … if this fails so that embarrassing people or patients are seen to
accumulate, then anxiety is aroused and some form of institution is set up to absorb the
problem … Not all embarrassing patients like being tidied up and these tend to be compulsorily
detained … Within the detaining institution two opposing aims begin to appear – the
therapeutic endeavour to cure and liberate on the one hand, and the controlling custodial
function on the other. (p.9).
Scott went on to suggest that although these functions should be complementary ‘there is a
tendency for them to polarise and ultimately, to split, like a dividing cell, into two separate
33 Millan, (Chairman), Review of the Mental Health
(Scotland) Act, 1984: First Consultation. (1999, S.O.)
Maclean, Lord, (Chairman), Report of the Committee
on Serious Violent and Sexual Offenders. (2000, Scottish
Executive). See also, Darjee, R. and Crichton, J.H.M.
(2002) ‘The Maclean Committee: Scotland’s Answer to
the “Dangerous People with Severe Personality
Disorder” Proposals?’ Psychiatric Bulletin, 26: 6–8.
34 Scott, P.D., Has Psychiatry Failed in the Treatment of
Offenders? (1975, Institute For the Study and Treatment
of Delinquency (ISTD)).
35 I emphasise the word so-called here because Scott did not
feel there was much merit in distinguishing psychopaths
from hardened chronic (recidivist) criminals – a
minority view. See Scott, P.D. (1960) ‘The Treatment of
Psychopaths.’ British Medical Journal, 2: 1641–1646.
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institutions’. However, he suggests that ‘neither of the two new institutions can quite eliminate the
tendency from which it fled, so that the therapeutic institution now begins to miss the custodial
function and tries hard to send some of its patients back to custody, and the custodial institution
is unable to tolerate being unkind to people all the time and begins to set up a new nucleus of
therapy’. (p.10). In time, each institution may divide. It would seem to me that Scott’s perceptive
‘managerial’ observations should be considered carefully by those involved in devising the future
institutional care for DSPD individuals envisaged in the policy development paper.36 So, these are
the unlikeable clients/patients/offenders. Often the dislike will operate at an unconscious level.
Three quotations from the views of psychiatrists are useful in illustrating this problem and their
words are applicable to all professionals working in the field of criminal justice and forensic-
psychiatry. Maier suggests:
Could it be after all these Freudian years, that psychiatrists have denied the hatred they feel for
psychopaths and criminals, and thus have been unable to treat psychopaths adequately because
their conceptual basis for treatment has been distorted by unconscious, denied feelings from
the start? (p.766).37
A somewhat similar view is proffered by Treves-Brown:
As long as a doctor believes that psychopaths are mostly ‘bad’, his successful treatment rate will
be dismal. Since it takes two to form a relationship, an outside observer could be forgiven for
suspecting that a doctor who describes a patient as unable to form a relationship, is simply
trying to justify his own hostility to this patient. (p.63).38
And the late Doctor Donald Winnicott – doyen of child psychiatry, writing over fifty years ago
about the ‘anti-social tendency’, gave further support for such views – as follows:
However much he loves his … [hard to like] … patients he cannot help hating them and fearing
them, and the better he knows this the less will hate and fear be the motives determining what
he does for his patients. (p.71).39
Despite the unattractiveness of such patients and the sometimes unconscious reactions of
therapists, a number of forensic-psychiatric and criminal justice professionals have expressed a
degree of optimism about treatment. Some years ago Tennent et al. sought the opinions of
psychiatrists, psychologists and probation officers about treatability. The survey was admittedly
small, as was the response rate. However, there was reasonable evidence to suggest that although
there were few clear-cut views as to the best treatment modalities, there were clear indications as to
those felt to be helpful. For example, there were higher expectations of treatment efficacy with
symptoms such as ‘chronically anti-social’, ‘abnormally aggressive’ and ‘lacking control over
impulses’ and much lower expectations for symptoms such as ‘inability to experience guilt’, ‘lack
of remorse or shame’ and ‘pathological egocentricity’.40 Some support for the findings of this
modest survey can be found in a more extensive survey by Cope on behalf of the Forensic Section
36 See footnote 5 supra.
37 Maier, G.J. (1990) ‘Psychopathic Disorders: Beyond
Counter-Transference.’ Current Opinion in Psychiatry,
3: 766–769.
38 Treves-Brown, C. (1977) ‘Who is the Psychopath?’
Medicine, Science and the Law, 17: 56–63.
39 Winnicott, D.W. (1949) ‘Hate in the Counter-
Transference.’ International Journal of Psychoanalysis,
30: 14–17. For a recent very extensive and perceptive
study of denial in all its forms, see Cohen, S., States of
Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suffering.
(2001, Polity Press).
40 Tennent, G., Tennent, D., Prins, H. and Bedford, A.
(1993) ‘Is Psychopathic Disorder a Treatable
Condition?’ Medicine, Science and the Law, 33: 63–66.
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of the Royal College of Psychiatrists. Cope surveyed all forensic psychiatrists working in Secure
Hospitals, units and similar settings in England and Wales. The majority of her respondents
(response rate 91%) were in favour of offering treatment to severely personality disordered
(psychopathic) patients.41 Some explanation for this optimism derives from another source. In a
fairly recent attempt to ascertain the motivations of consultant forensic psychiatrists for working
in forensic settings, I discovered that one of the attractions of the work was the challenge presented
by psychopaths.42 Another fact that emerged from my survey was the need for forensic
psychiatrists to work with and encourage their colleagues in general psychiatry to deal with such
patients; a point made very cogently recently by Professor John Gunn.43
Some of the statements made by my respondents were very illuminating. One of them enjoyed the
challenge presented by the severity and complexity of the cases which produced ‘a kind of appalled
fascination’. Another attraction was the chance to work with a wide range of agencies and
disciplines and to pursue a more eclectic approach to patient care. Stimulation was another
important factor (a factor shared with the psychopathic – see earlier discussion). One stated ‘I
could not envisage twenty years of listening to the neurotic and worried well’; ‘after forensic
psychiatry, other specialities seemed very tame and had much less variety and challenge’.
Whatever form of professional training is eventually formulated in order to deal more effectively
with psychopathically disordered individuals, understanding and management will only be
successful through the adoption of a truly multi-disciplinary approach (as suggested in the
‘imaginary’ seminar quoted at the beginning of this contribution). Such an approach would not
only serve to take the broadest possible view of the topic but, at a narrower clinical level, should
help to obviate potential missed diagnoses (for example, the importance of organic factors such as
brain damage). Severely dangerous and deviant behaviour requires calm and well-informed
confrontation. In the words of the late George Lyward – a highly gifted worker with severely
personality disordered boys – ‘Patience is love that can wait’. Coupled to this is the need to
tolerate, without loss of temper, the hate, hostility, manipulation, and ‘splitting’ shown by such
individuals and an ability not to take such personal affronts as attacks. The psychiatrist and
psychotherapist Penelope Campling has provided an excellent account of the management of such
behaviours.44 It is essential for professionals to have more than an intellectual understanding of
what the patient has done. Sometimes, this can be ‘stomach-turning’ and offers many
opportunities for denial on the part of the professional. Such understanding requires a degree of
what has been described in another context as ‘intestinal fortitude’.45
It is worth emphasising once again the importance of the phenomenon of denial. It is not the sole
prerogative of our clients/patients/offenders. For, as Pericles says in Shakespeare’s play of that
name, ‘Few love to hear the sins they love to act’, (Act I, Sc i). The more troublesome and anxiety-
41 Cope, R. (1993) ‘A Survey of Forensic Psychiatrists’
Views on Psychopathic Disorder.’ Journal of Forensic
Psychiatry, 4: 214–235. For a more recent study, dealing
in particular with DSPD, see: Haddock, A., Snowden,
P., Dolan, M., Parker, J. and Rees, H. (2001)
‘Managing Dangerous People With Severe Personality
Disorder: A Survey of Forensic Psychiatrists’ Opinions.’
Psychiatric Bulletin, 25: 293–296.
42 Prins, H. (1998) ‘Characteristics of Consultant
Forensic Psychiatrists: A Modest Survey.’ Journal of
Forensic Psychiatry, 9: 139–149.
43 Gunn, J. (2000) Editorial: ‘A Millennium Monster is
Born. ’ Criminal Behaviour and Mental Health, 10:
73–76.
44 See Campling, P. (1996) ‘Maintaining the Therapeutic
Alliance With Personality Disordered Patients.’ Journal
of Forensic Psychiatry, 7: 535–550.
45 An expression used by Michael Davies, Leader of the
BBC Symphony Orchestra, in relation to the playing of
certain problematic orchestral works. (BBC2 July 10,
1999).
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making the relationship, the more the need not to go it alone. This is not an area of work that
should be characterised by ‘prima donna’ activities by professionals of either sex. There are
dangerous workers as well as dangerous clients/patients/offenders. There are three qualities that are
of paramount importance in dealing with the severely personality (psychopathically) disordered
individual. These are consistence (the capacity to take a firm line in the fact of deflecting activities
on the part of the client); persistence (efforts may need to be expended over very considerable
periods of time, maybe years – a view that is supported by the belief in the occurrence of cortical
maturation in some cases, aided by therapeutic interventions); insistence (the capacity to give clear
indications that requirements of supervision are to be met in spite of resistance on the part of the
client). Such insistence must take priority of place when expectations of what supervision requires
of the client are initially set out in the professional/client relationship.
Conclusion – present and future
We should recognise that in strictly scientific terms we have few hard facts concerning the genesis
of severe personality (psychopathic) disorder. What we do know is that those suffering from (or,
to be more precise, making others suffer from) it are extremely difficult to work with and manage.
‘The diagnosis of personality disorder is used … [in the government’s policy documents on DSPD]
… with apparent confidence … and the government’s recommendations rely heavily on the
premise that the term refers to a group of patients who can be clearly defined and gathered together
…’.46 As I hope this contribution has shown, this is hardly likely to be the case in the present state
of our knowledge.
It is my view that a change in name is of itself unlikely to quell anxieties and a reluctance to work
with this group of individuals. Nor is the introduction of new or re-designed specially designated
services likely to provide a panacea. Better use of existing and much better funding for such services,
shared endeavour (and the encouragement of general psychiatry to become more involved), the
encouragement of a greater degree of self-examination on the part of all concerned in the criminal
justice and mental health systems may be the most productive ways forward. In June 2002, the
Government produced its long-awaited Bill on the reform of mental health legislation. Interestingly,
the Bill comes as a draft, and is accompanied by two documents – one containing detailed Explanatory
Notes on the Bill, and the other is a Consultation Document. It would seem that the Government wishes
to anticipate likely choruses of criticism and to defuse them as much as possible.47 It is of interest to
note that this highly complex and complicated proposed piece of legislation runs to some 180
sections and 9 schedules; this compares with 149 sections and 6 schedules in the 1983 Act.
Implementation of the new legislation is likely to have enormous financial and human resource
implications. The Consultation Document refers to matters that are not in the Draft Bill but which will
also be brought before Parliament when the Bill is introduced. Notably, these matters concern a
specialist division of a new Health Care Inspectorate, which will replace the Mental Health Act
Commission; this new body will have wider powers and sharper teeth.
46 See Mann, A. and Moran, P. (2000) ‘Personality
Disorder As a Reason For Action.’ Journal of Forensic
Psychiatry, 11: 11–16. See also Laing, op. cit. (notably
at pp. 98 et seq) – footnote 6 supra.
47 Draft Mental Health Bill. Cm. 5538-II (2002
Department of Health); Draft Mental Health Bill:
Explanatory Notes, CM 5538-II (2002, Department of
Health); Mental Health Bill: Consultation Document,
CM. 5538-II. (2002, Department of Health). 
A consultation period has been established which will
run for 12 weeks from June, 25th 2002.
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There are also proposals for revised legislation in respect of children and for the protection of
health care workers and numerous other matters. This is not the place to comment upon the
general proposals in the draft legislation, but merely to refer to those proposals for dealing with
persons demonstrating severe personality (psychopathic) disorder, and, in particular, DSPD. 
The Mental Health Bill was conspicuously absent from the Queens Speech to Parliament on
November 13th. This had led to some speculation that the reforms were not going to be proceeded
with as a result of powerful lobbying against them. However, on November 14th, the Health
Secretary, Alan Milburn indicated that the Government would press ahead with a Bill when they
had finished considering the 2,000 or so responses they had received. “When we have finished
considering these responses we will bring forward a Bill during the course of this session” (The
Independent, November 15, p10). It will be interesting to see the extent to which some of the more
controversial proposals in the present draft Bill receive some modification when the revised Bill is
presented. The Government has accepted the definition of mental disorder suggested in the
Richardson Review; it is presented as ‘any disability or disorder of mind or brain which results in
an impairment or disturbance of mental functioning. This new composite definition removes
‘psychopathic disorder’, and as a result the ‘treatability test’. The latter, of course, had the effect
of excluding a number of people considered to have a potential for dangerous behaviour towards
others. The Consultation Document states that ‘People with severe responsibility disorders will have
access to services in the same way as people with other forms of mental disorder’.(p.1.) In respect
of DSPD the document has this to say:
There is no separate legislation for ‘DSPD’. The term, which refers to the small group of people
with severe personality disorder who also represent a high degree of risk to the public, does not
appear in the new Bill. (Emphasis added). People with personality disorders will be treated in
exactly the same way as patients with other mental disorders and will come under compulsory
powers if they meet the same conditions for compulsion. (p.23.)
The Consultative Document goes on to indicate that service developments (for those considered to
be dangerous) are not part of legislative proposals but ‘are part of the wider agenda to provide
better mental health services for everyone.’ (p23). However, the document goes on to indicate that
services will be provided by specialist units (such as those now being developed at Rampton
Hospital and HM Prison Whitemoor). Two further units are planned, one hospital and one prison
based.48 The Consultation Document poses a number of questions to which responses will be
welcomed. One significant question in relation to this article is: Will the Legislation allow
intermediate detention of dangerous offenders? The answer given is as follows:
The new legislation will allow for the detention of someone with mental disorder for as long as
they pose a significant risk of serious harm to others as a result of their mental disorder,
thereby meeting the conditions for compulsion. In some cases where the mental disorder, and
the behaviours arising from it, are complex and difficult to manage, and individual may be
detained in hospital for a long time. (Emphasis added). However, to safeguard people from
detention where it may not be justified, the new Mental Health Tribunal will regularly review
48 For a very useful and recent account of the regime in the
DSPD Unit at HMP Whitemoor see Bennett J (2002)
The Role of Prison Officers in the Dangerous and
Severe Personality Disorder Unit at HMP Whitemoor:
Prison Service Journal 143 (September);9–14. See also
Bowers L (2002) “Working Positively and Productively
in a DSPD Unit; Prison Service Journal 143
(September) 21–22 and Storey L (2002) ‘Staff
Development in Personality Disorder Services’ Prison
Service Journal 143 (September): 23–27.
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the patient’s compulsory treatment order to consider whether the conditions for compulsion
continue to be met. (p.23).
In my mind, a further question arises. What happens if staff in one of the new specialist units
consider that such a person is ‘untreatable’ at any stage? I could not find anything in the
documentation that seemed to deal with such an eventuality, but, maybe I missed it.
A fitting conclusion for this contribution can be found in a short statement by Walker and
McCabe in their seminal study Crime and Insanity in England.
… the history of ‘psychopathy’ begins with the formation of a concept in the minds of
philosophers and mad-doctors. Thereafter, the concept becomes linked with a succession of ill-
defined terms of art, until one of these is seized on by legislators and bundled into the statute
book. The resulting trouble takes half a century to recognise and remedy, and today it remains
uncertain whether the remedy is entirely successful.49
Readers are left to decide for themselves whether or not this quotation, written nearly thirty years
ago, continues to reflect the position today and is also supportive of the contention in the title of
this paper.50
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